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Merger and acquisition (M&A) activity has grown significantly in recent years, with reported 
deal values well above historical averages (Kengelbach et al., 2017). A key challenge for 
managers involved in M&As is to retain employees post-merger (Ernst & Vitt, 2000; Younge, 
Tong, & Fleming, 2015). Studies have shown that employee turnover post-merger has 
important implications for the M&A, for instance, it compromises transfer of know-how 
(Ahammad, Tarba, Liu, & Glaister, 2016), integration (Ernst & Vitt, 2000), and the overall 
performance of the merger (Ahammad et al., 2016).  
 To understand why employees leave post-merger, a stream of research has examined 
the effect of culture; surmising that employees leave the merger mainly because cultural 
differences create identification issues, which in turn, trigger conflicts and reduce commitment 
within the newly formed organization (Cho, Lee, & Kim, 2014; Van Knippenberg, Van 
Knippenberg, Monden, & de Lima, 2002). In this vein, studies have examined how effective 
communication and other methods of active human resource management post-merger, such 
as creating shared organizational values, can reduce conflicts and employee turnover 
(Birkinshaw, Bresman, & Håkanson, 2000).  
Despite the risks in mergers that arise from employee turnover, the literature has not 
adequately explored how managers can proactively work before the M&A announcement to 
reduce the probability of losing employees (Younge et al., 2015). Yet managers at the acquiring 
firm should be motivated to manage the risk of employee turnover post-merger early on in the 
acquisition process because the firm undertakes significant commitment at the stage of bidding 
for the target company. A few studies have recognized that managers try to deal with M&A 
risks proactively (Coff, 1999, 2002), and more to the point, Younge et al. (2015) have found 
that anticipated employee departure from a focal firm had a negative effect on the likelihood 
of the firm becoming an acquisition target. Their study, however, did not deal with the 
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underlying organizational challenge of addressing deep-seated value differences between the 
merging workforces. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that managers do consider 
organizational values in their ex-ante assessment. For example, the CEO of Lincoln Electric 
discussed the company’s unique culture that contributed to productivity, and how decisions 
about potential acquisitions considered the prospect for implementing a similar culture 
(Hastings, 1999). Therefore, from a theoretical, as well as a practitioner standpoint, examining 
merging organizations’ compatibility in terms of their value profiles prior to the merger could 
help ensure employee fit with the newly formed organization and prevent attrition. However, 
research is lacking in this area, because unless some stable, apriori gauge of values relevant to 
an individual’s self-concept are identified, it will be difficult to study how value profiles factor 
into merger considerations. 
Recent literature and anecdotal evidence, however, suggest that employees whose 
political ideology is at odds with the political ideology of their organization are more likely to 
leave their company. Political ideology, in an organizational context, is defined as the 
prevailing values amongst organizational members on how society and micro-societies, such 
as the organization, should operate, and it includes convictions on what outcomes are desirable, 
and how they should be achieved (Gupta, Briscoe, & Hambrick, 2017). Specifically, Bermiss 
and McDonald (2018) draw on Person-Organization (P-O) fit, defined as the conguence 
between individual employee values and those of the organization (Chatman, 1991), to argue 
that when employees experience misfit in political ideology they are more likely to leave.  
These researchers find  that employees whose political ideology is more conservative than the 
firm’s are more likely to leave the firm; moreover, employees who experience misfit are more 
likely to join firms that exhibit ideologies closer to their own. Separately, press articles 
highlight ideological conflict within organizations; for example, there are reports in the press 
of employees revolting against their employers’ social practices, conflicts amongst employees 
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due to different political ideologies, and differential treatment of employees by employers 
(Fortson, 2018; Kuchler, 2018). 
Motivated by this evidence, this study introduces to the M&A literature the idea of 
organizational political ideology matching; suggesting that managers at the acquiring firm 
become aware that potential mismatching of the merging organizations’ political ideologies 
can hinder employee retention post-merger, and therefore they avoid such mergers. 
Organizational political ideology is different from organizational culture, in that the latter is 
largely invented, discovered, or developed by a given group (Schein, 1990), whereas the former 
is extra-organizational – imported by employees into an organization as it is reflective of their 
personal values, and is therefore relatively coherent and stable. As a result, unlike 
organizational culture, which can be engineered post-merger to foster a common identity 
between the merging organizations , organizational political ideology cannot be contrived (Jost, 
Federico, & Napier, 2009). In addition, studies have supported that culture is multilevel; 
formed by the co-existence of national, industrial, organizational, functional and professional 
cultures (Teerikangas & Very, 2006). Drawing on this literature we suggest that organizational 
political ideology is another layer of culture that operates at the societal level, and therefore, 
sits on top of organizational culture. This is because political ideology deals with the higher 
order social values of the individual, which are innate, develop early in life, and are stable over 
time (Jost et al., 2009). Consequently, political ideology is likely to be a deeply rooted part of 
individuals’ orientations, and thus, differences between merging organizations may easily 
create P-O misfit. 
The idea that M&As are influenced by the ideological leanings of the merging 
organizations raises an important research question: ‘Does similarity of the political ideologies 
of the merging organizations affect merger likelihood?’. To shed light on this research question 
this paper draws on the literature on P-O fit (Chatman, 1989, 1991) and the research on political 
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ideology  (Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 2013; Gupta et al., 2017; Jost et al., 2009) to posit that, 
given the importance of a matching organizational ideology for retaining employees, managers 
of the acquiring firm are more likely to bid for likeminded partner organizations, given that 
other important factors for the M&A are met. To elaborate on the logic that drives the main 
relationship, we suggest that the strength of the relationship of similar political ideology 
between the merging organizations and the likelihood of announcement should be stronger 
when the political ideology in the acquiring organization is more homogeneous, since this may 
imply that ideology matters more to employees. Moreover, we suggest that managers may be 
more motivated to seek matching ideologies in mergers of firms with higher human-capital 
intensity, because retention of employees is much more critical in such mergers.  
This study makes several contributions. First, we integrate P-O fit literature with political 
ideology literature to introduce the concept of organizational political ideology into the debate 
over the influence of organizational values on M&As. We suggest that managers consider 
ideological matching when bidding for an M&A target because social perspectives have 
material repercussions on perceptions of P-O fit and employee turnover (Bermiss & McDonald, 
2018; Sacco & Schmitt, 2005). This matching perspective is necessary for extending the 
theoretical application of political ideology to settings of inter-organizational partnerships 
where employees become part of a new organization. To date, the literature on organizational 
political ideology has been mainly concerned with internal issues such as equality and CSR. 
Second, our approach extends the literature on the cultural perspective of M&As, which 
attempts to gauge the potential compatibilities between two merger partners (Riad, 2005). By 
delving deeper into the issue of cultural problematics (Angwin & Vaara, 2005), we are able to 
go beyond traditional organizational cultural differences to search for a new concept (political 
ideology) to explain M&A difficulties. We contend that, since political ideology, by definition, 
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is rooted in individuals’ core concept and deals with higher order social beliefs, it is a more 
difficult aspect of incompatibility to manage post-merger.  
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES  
Research that has examined the impact of M&As on employees has largely shown that cultural 
mismatch is detrimental because it creates organizational identification issues (Rottig & Reus, 
2018; Van Knippenberg et al., 2002). Organizational identification signifies the attachment of 
employees to their organizations (Herrbach, 2006), and manifests itself in a variety of 
sometimes non-conscious prosocial behaviors toward the organization (Cho et al., 2014). If 
one’s self-concept is partially based on one’s organizational membership, theoretically it stands 
to reason that one will participate in the activities of that organization because such 
participation clarifies and affirms the self-concept (Cho et al., 2014). Conversely, if employees 
dis-identify with the merged entity due to cultural mismatch, this will lead to negative affect, 
lowered commitment (Fugate, Kinicki, & Scheck, 2002; Terry, Carey, & Callan, 2001) and 
greater turnover (Cho et al., 2014). 
Relatedly, notions of person-organization fit are particularly prominent in discussions on 
employee dissatisfaction and pressures to leave (Bermiss & McDonald, 2018). Whilst M&A 
research generally does not refer explicitly to P-O fit, P-O fit belongs to the larger genre of 
interactional organizational research, and individuals’ identification with their organizations 
can be construed to be a part of this. For example, models of P-O fit (Chatman, 1989, 1991) 
examine how (in)congruence between a person’s values and those of the organization impacts 
a variety of organizational outcomes (Bermiss & McDonald, 2018, p. 2183). Employees who 
experience P-O misfit may feel unwelcome and experience alienation which leads to 
dissatisfaction, withdrawal and departure (Chatman, 1989). Moreover, P-O fit can be shaped 
by congruence in political ideology (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994), and misfit can lead 
to employee turnover (Bermiss & McDonald, 2018). 
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The concern about ideological fit is heightened in M&As because political ideology is 
found to be stable and enduring regardless of context (Block & Block, 2006). In the research 
on political ideology, there is consensus that people adhere to certain political ideas due to their 
intrinsic relational, epistemic, and existential needs, and therefore, ideology cannot simply be 
contrived by membership in groups, such as by position in society or through organizational 
membership (Jost, 2006). Political ideology is, in fact, a complex compendium of heredity, 
childhood influences and temperament, situational and dispositional variability in social, 
cognitive, and motivational needs to reduce uncertainty, and, at the same time, tends to be 
rooted in a corresponding value system which is part of the broader society (Gupta et al., 2017; 
Jost et al., 2009). Therefore, according to research, individuals exhibit either a proclivity 
toward a liberal stance or conservative orientation (Jost et al., 2009). Conservatives (liberals) 
tend to be more (less) supportive of inequality, mistrustful (trustful) of human nature, 
disciplinary (less disciplinary) toward norm violators, and have greater (less) personal need for 
order and closure (Jost et al., 2009; Tetlock, Vieider, Patil, & Grant, 2013). Such inclinations 
have implications on a whole host of social issues, including marriage, the family unit, the role 
of government, the work ethic, and capitalism, amongst others (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008).  
Additionally, and more to the purpose of this study, ideologies are likely to endure 
within organizations through the processes of attraction-selection-attrition (Schneider, 1987). 
Research on attraction-selection-attrition processes has shown that employees are attracted to 
and remain in organizations that resonate with their personal leanings (Chatman, 1991). The 
alternative, person-organization misfit, often leads to negative employee work experiences that 
increase attrition likelihood (Bermiss & McDonald, 2018; Sacco & Schmitt, 2005). Therefore 
these evolutionary processes may in many organizations give rise to distinct political 
ideologies, shifting firms’ practices and structures in the direction of the dominant ideology 
(Schneider, 1987).  
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Organizational political ideology similarity and M&A announcements 
Building on research which shows that political ideology substantially contributes to (mis-)fit 
perceptions in organizations (Johnson & Roberto, 2018; Roth, Goldberg, & Thatcher, 2017), 
we note that social values are part of the self- concept, and individuals look to their organization 
to reinforce these values (Besharov, 2014). M&As should amplify misfit issues when political 
ideologies in the merging organizations are widely disparate, because these M&As dilute the 
dominant ideology in the merging organizations by juxtaposing inimical beliefs which may be 
uncomfortable for employees in both organizations (Van Knippenberg et al., 2002). Ideology 
serves as a “guide for action” for organizational members in deciding whether to accept (or 
not) certain practices or policies. Therefore, when the ideologies of the merging organizations 
are widely disparate, contrasting social beliefs on issues that occupy every-day life in the work 
environment, such as gender or minority equality, or effort-pay practices, may be perceived by 
employees as differences that are difficult to traverse (Dutton et al., 1994). This results in a 
lack of social cohesion which emanates from employees not sharing similar values (Tsui, Egan, 
& O'Reilly, 1992).  
At the same time, ideological differences are also deep-level in nature and as such are 
divisive and much harder to bridge (Swigart, Anantharaman, Williamson, & Grandey, 2020). 
This is supported by prior work on P-O fit which has demonstrated that individuals who deviate 
from the prevailing ideological environment in organizations feel stronger hostility and 
alienation from their colleagues (Chatman, 1991; Duarte et al., 2015; Sacco & Schmitt, 2005). 
For example, Duarte et al. (2015) reported that conservative-leaning graduate students in liberal 
leaning academic organizations faced intense hostility and ridicule that forced them to stay “in 
the closet” regarding their political beliefs, or else they had to leave. Given such costs, it is 
conceivable that employees who do not fit-in in a merger may try to adapt to the organizational 
ideology of the newly formed organization in some superficial way. However, studies have 
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shown that maintaining such facades of conformity leads to more exhaustion, withdrawal 
cognitions (Bermiss & McDonald, 2018; Swigart et al., 2020), and turnover (Bermiss & 
McDonald, 2018). Indeed, Bermiss and McDonald (2018) argued that employees experiencing 
misfit regard it as detrimental to their sense of social cohesion and well-being within their 
organization, and eventually leave the firm. 
 Conversely, similarity of political ideology between merging organizations should 
predispose employees to stay because employees will share the same political ideology with 
the newly formed organization. To the extent that political ideology was a reason for an 
individual joining their organization, according to the ASA model, these employees should still 
experience fit with the newly formed organization. P-O fit should improve job satisfaction and 
commitment since employees can engage in a meaningful way with the newly formed 
organization (Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005).  For example, findings show that 
such strong identification between colleagues fosters feelings of closeness and enriches social 
interactions (Dokko, Kane, & Tortoriello, 2014; Wilson, Boyer O'Leary, Metiu, & Jett, 2008).  
Managers, through socialization processes and their familiarity with mid- and low-level 
executive proposals (Briscoe & Joshi, 2017; Gupta et al., 2017) may be aware that 
organizational political ideology is important for employees, and that preserving it may help 
with post-merger retention. This is consistent with research which shows that managers adopt 
certain practices or policies in line with the collective (Gupta & Briscoe, 2019; Gupta et al., 
2017). For example, Gupta et al. (2017) have discussed how political ideology develops in 
some organizations into a prevailing and salient system, and that, employees in liberal leaning 
organizations will tend to propose, promote and approve CSR initiatives because they share 
stronger views about the company’s responsibilities toward stakeholders.   
To the extent that managers are aware that P-O misfit in ideology may lead to employee 
turnover post-merger, they may proactively try to manage this risk. As we discussed, previous 
10 
 
studies have shown that acquirers take proactive actions to protect the merger (Coff, 1999, 
2002), and in particular,  Younge et al. (2015) indicated that firms tend to avoid acquisitions 
when they anticipate high employee turnover after the merger. Consequently, since 
organizational political ideology is salient and a mismatch can create significant problems for 
the M&A through employee departures, managers may proactively try to manage this risk by 
bidding for organizations that are ideologically similar to their own. Therefore, we expect that:  
H1: The probability of announcement of a merger increases when the merging firms have more 
similar organizational political ideologies.  
Homogeneity in ideology among employees within the organization should imply that ideology 
matters more for employees than when ideology is heterogeneous. Drawing on the ASA model 
(Schneider, 1987), we argue that homogeneity in ideology within the organization develops 
because ideology acts as a magnet for similarly minded people. Organizations can drift toward 
member homogenization because individuals are attracted to places where current members 
and policies suit them (Gupta et al., 2017). Where homogeneity in organizational ideological 
leaning arises, this would be reinforced over time by further homogenizing evolutionary 
processes (Gupta & Briscoe, 2019). As Gupta et al. (2017) assert, the clustering of individuals 
with similar political ideology within an organization and their ongoing interactions will give 
rise to a prevailing system of political ideology-related beliefs that is more salient to insiders 
and even, to a certain extent, to outsiders. Conversely, if ideology is more heterogeneous within 
the acquiring organization, this would imply that people are less attracted to that organization 
on the basis of ideology.  
Consequently, we assert that when ideology matters more for employees, as shown by 
the degree of homogeneity of ideology within the organization, managers tend to take greater 
notice of this as a factor, because, as we have discussed, employees through their actions create 
managerial perceptions about the organization’s social preferences (Gupta et al., 2017). In such 
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a scenario, organizational political ideology may be more pertinent to corporate decision-
making. Indeed, researchers note that managers, due to their cognitive limitations, tend to pay 
more or less attention to organizational conditions depending on the circumstance (Cyert & 
March, 1963). This stream of literature suggests that organizational context fundamentally 
shapes the decision criteria that managers consider and prioritize (Gupta & Briscoe, 2019).  
Therefore, to the extent that managers become more aware that employees draw on 
political ideology to identify with their organization, and that this factor increases employee 
retention, acquirers with more homogeneous ideology are more likely to announce mergers 
with targets with similar political ideology. By contrast, when political ideology is more 
heterogeneous, P-O political ideological misfit after the merger may not be perceived as 
important, which may lead to less concerns about employee turnover as a result of political 
ideology differences. Therefore, acquirers may be less likely to seek targets with similar 
organizational political ideology. According, we posit that:  
H2: The positive relationship between the similar organizational political ideologies of the 
merging firms and the probability of announcement of a merger will be strengthened when the 
political ideology within the acquiring organization is more homogeneous. 
As we have discussed, in an M&A, employee retention is important for transfer of know-how 
(Ahammad et al., 2016; Coff, 1999). Nevertheless, when high human-capital intensive firms 
are involved in the merger, employee retention becomes even more important for two reasons. 
First, human-capital intensive firms tend to rely heavily on “knowledge workers” for running 
the firm’s operations and depend on these employees to transfer know-how to the merger in 
key areas such as production and marketing (Coff, 1999). These are  employees with a high 
level of education, and whose work involves complex tasks, such as handling abstract 
information in contexts of non-routine problem solving (Davenport, 2013). Second, knowledge 
workers have greater opportunity for employment outside of their firm because of the skills 
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and know-how they have gleaned over the years from a rigorous education system, as well as 
the proprietary knowledge that they may have gained from the focal firm. Therefore, employee 
attrition may deter to a greater extent the transfer of know-how, creating a greater knowledge 
vacuum in critical functions of the merger that involve tacit knowledge, such as the production 
function (Tan & Rider, 2017). 
  Stakeholder theorists, such as Clarkson (1995), argue that managers will tend to take 
employee preferences into account particularly when the corporation is very dependent on this 
crucial stakeholder group, and retaining these employees is deemed critical for the firm. 
Therefore, to the extent that mergers with similar political ideologies create P-O fit and increase 
employee retention post-merger, firms may more vigorously seek to retain employees in more 
human-capital intensive mergers, and therefore, are more likely to choose a target firm with 
similar political ideology. By contrast, in less human capital-intensive mergers firms may pay 
less attention to similar political ideology in choosing a partner because employees may find it 
more difficult to leave the merger, and in addition, the difficulty of transferring know-how, and 
the loss of know-how due to employee attrition may be less important for the merger. 
Accordingly, we assert that:  
H3: The positive relationship between the similar organizational political ideologies of the 
merging firms and the probability of announcement of a merger will be strengthened the higher 
the human-capital intensity of the merging firms.  
METHODS 
Research Design 
To test our hypotheses we model a choice problem (McFadden (1973). To construct 
meaningful alternatives to actual M&A pairs ideally, we need to know what alternative target 
firms were considered by the acquirer. Nevertheless, this information is not available and as a 
second-best alternative we seek to identify hypothetical pairs that match the characteristics of 
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the actual M&A, as well as the characteristics of the acquirer and the target. To achieve this, 
we first identified actual M&A pairs, and then, we performed a matching procedure to identify 
meaningful hypothetical M&A pairs (i.e. pairs of companies that could have proceeded with 
an M&A, but did not). The matching procedure, as described in detail in the next section, was 
performed along two dimensions: (i) Actual M&A pair characteristics, and (ii) Acquirer and 
target firm characteristics. Finally, we employed conditional logistic regression analysis to 
model the probability of being an actual rather than a hypothetical M&A deal (McFadden, 
1973). This approach is suitable for our setting because it uses variation only among the actual 
M&As and their corresponding hypothetical M&A deals, conditional on the likelihood of 
control variables. 
Actual and hypothetical M&A pairing sample 
To construct our actual M&A pair sample, we used multiple sources of data. First, we identified 
M&A deals announced during the period 1996-2014 from Thomson Financials’ Security Data 
Corporation (SDC) database. We excluded M&A deals that did not satisfy the following 
requirements: (i) M&As that were not coded as mergers, acquisitions of majority interest, or 
acquisitions of assets, (ii) M&As that were not considered as friendly, (iii) M&As where the 
acquirer company did not obtain control of the target shares (i.e. at least 51% of the target 
shares) or had control of the target shares prior to the deal, (iv) M&As where either the 
acquirer’s or the target’s CUSIP/TICKER could not be matched with Standard and Poor’s 
ExecuComp, and (v) M&As where either the acquirer or the target are not US based. Second, 
we used the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to identify historical 
names of firms and ExecuComp database to identify firms’ executives, and then, merged this 
information with the Database on Ideology, Money, and Elections (DIME)  (Bonica, 2016). 
DIME provides a unique contributor ID that was constructed using a record linkage 
algorithm (Bonica, 2014). This ID eases the process of retrieving political donations of all 
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firm’s employees by accurately matching all the employees of each firm. Finally, we obtained 
firms’ financial information from Standard and Poor’s Compustat Annual and Segment 
database. The final sample consists of 479 actual M&As with available financial information, 
and information about employees’ political donations.  
To construct our hypothetical M&A pair sample we used a matching procedure. First, 
we included a time-related condition because actual M&As cluster in specific periods of time 
(Harford, 2005). In addition, to avoid M&A confounding effects, we required that firms did 
not engage in an M&A deal during either the corresponding fiscal year or the year before the 
M&A announcement. Second, like Rogan and Sorenson (2014) we used coarsened exact 
matching (CEM) to identify hypothetical M&A pairs that exhibit similar pair characteristics 
relative to the actual M&A pair. According to Iacus, King, and Porro (2012), CEM dominates 
other common techniques that match based on observables. Pair characteristics are informed 
by prior literature and include the product similarity score (Hoberg & Phillips, 2010), the 
distance between acquirer and target headquarters (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011), the difference 
between acquirer and target size (Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson, 2008), and the difference 
between acquirer and target market-to-book ratio (Rhodes-Kropf & Robinson, 2008). For each 
actual M&A pair, we chose as eligible hypothetical M&A pairs the ones that belong to the 
same strata. Pair characteristics concerning political ideology are left out of the matching 
procedure in order to examine their direct effects. Finally, among the eligible hypothetical 
M&A pairs we used another CEM algorithm to find hypothetical acquirer and target firms that 
exhibit similar firm characteristics. To avoid covariate imbalance problems between actual and 
matched hypothetical M&A pairs we chose a parsimonious model and included as covariates 
the size and the market-to-book ratio. We separately used CEM algorithm for (i) actual acquirer 
and hypothetical acquirer and (ii) actual target and hypothetical target. Among the eligible 
hypothetical M&A pairs we then selected all the pairs where the acquirer (target) also belonged 
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to the corresponding acquirer (target) strata. There is no hard rule that oversees the selection of 
matched hypothetical M&A pairs, but generally fewer hypothetical M&A pairs per actual 
M&A pair produce larger standard errors. Thus, following Rogan and Sorenson (2014), we 
randomly selected up to ten hypothetical M&A pairs. When the eligible hypothetical M&A 
pairs were less than ten, we selected all the firms. Our results remain robust when using fewer 
matched hypothetical M&A pairs, such as, three pairs per actual M&A pair. The final sample 
consisted of 2,899 hypothetical M&A pairs.  
Variables and measurement 
The unit of analysis is the M&A pair, which consists of actual M&A pairs and hypothetical 
M&A pairs.  
Dependent Variable 
To investigate the role of organizational political ideology on M&A pairing we used a 
dichotomous variable (Actual M&A Dummy) that enabled us to compare the similarity of 
organizational political ideology in actual M&A pairs with hypothetical M&A pairs. We 
measure the dependent variable at year t and the main explanatory variables, the moderator 
variables and the control variables at year t-1.     
Main explanatory variable  
M&As with similar organizational political ideology. We have used the measure developed by 
Gupta et al. (2017) because this measure is shown to exhibit coherence when aggregated at 
firm level. Specifically the scores are reliable across different parts of the organization, and, in 
line with the ASA model, the scores are stable over time (Gupta et al. (2017). The measure 
utilizes four-dimensions of the organization’s political ideology based on the political 
donations made by each firm’s employees to Democratic and Republican parties, their 
candidates and associated political action committees (PACs), as recorded in DIME. It worth 
noting that donations made by the CEO and the top management team (TMT), as identified in 
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Execucomp, are not included when constructing this measure. A separate measure of 
CEO/TMT is described below and is included as a control variable. The key dimensions of the 
measure were the following: (i) total amount given to the Democratic Party (in dollars) divided 
by the total amount given to both parties; (ii) number of donations to the Democratic Party, 
divided by the number given to both parties; (iii) number of unique employee donors to the 
Democratic Party, divided by the number of employee donors to both parties; and (iv) number 
of unique Democratic recipients of donation, divided by the number of all unique recipients. 
Each dimension ranges from 0, more conservatism, to 1, more liberalism. We estimated the 
measure at the organization level using employee data from the five most recent election cycles 
(organizational political ideology). We chose five election cycles to alleviate biases from 
incidental or token behaviors (Chin et al., 2013). Nevertheless, our findings remain 
qualitatively similar if we had instead chosen two election cycles, which is the shortest window 
used by previous studies (Cooper, Gulen, & Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Gupta et al., 2017). Finally, 
we estimated the similarity of organizational political ideology as the absolute difference of 
the organizational political ideology between the M&A acquirer and its target multiplied by -
1 (s|Organizational political ideology|), whether actual or hypothetical. We multiplied by -1 
so that larger values indicate greater similarity.   
Moderator variables 
Acquirer’s organizational political ideology homogeneity. Homogeneity of political ideology 
within the organization implies that employees largely adopt similar ideology. Therefore, we 
measured the homogeneity of an acquirer’s organizational political ideology using the 
coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation of each individual employee political 
ideology score deflated by the average score among all employees. We multiplied the measure 
by -1 so that larger values indicate greater homogeneity (Acquirer’s organizational political 
ideology homogeneity). Because the measure of organizational political ideology includes two 
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dimensions (iii and iv) which are meaningless when measuring ideology at employee level, the 
individual employee political ideology score was constructed by adopting the approach of Chin 
et al. (2013). Specifically, we constructed a four-dimensional measure of employee’s political 
ideology by using the contributions of each employee in the last ten years. The four dimensions 
are the following: (i) number of donations to the Democratic party, divided by the number of 
donations to both parties; (ii) total dollar amount given to the Democratic party divided by the 
total amount given to both parties; (iii) the number of years (over the 10-year window) the 
employee made donations to the Democratic party divided by the number of years donations 
were made to either party; and (iv) number of unique Democratic donation recipients, divided 
by the number of all unique recipients. The individual employee political ideology score was 
the average of these dimensions.  
M&A human-capital intensity. Similar to Gupta et al. (2017), we assumed that human-capital 
intensity is predominantly positively related to the average employee pay. Thus, we created a 
proxy of M&A human-capital intensity using the average employee’s pay between acquirer 
and target. The employee’s pay is defined as the ratio of staff and related expenses to the 
number of employees. If the ratio was missing, we used a predictive linear regression to impute 
missing data. Specifically, the dependent variable was the employee expense deflated by the 
number of employees and the antecedents of employee compensation were based on the 
organizational and environmental contexts of the firm. Concerning organizational context, we 
included income statement items such as cost of goods sold and the selling, general and 
administrative expenses that capture information about an organization’s total expenses. In 
addition, because larger firms may pay employees more (Brown & Medoff, 1989) we also 
controlled for firm size using total sales. All variables are deflated by the number of employees.  
An organization’s environmental context may also influence employee compensation 
in an indirect way, for instance, through an analysis of factors such as demand and supply of 
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labor, economic conditions, and cost of living. Because such factors change across different 
environmental conditions, some of the organizational context’s relationships with employee 
compensation will not be stable; rather, they will vary across time. To control for the indirect 
impact of an organization’s environmental context in the model, we (i) estimate the model on 
a yearly basis, (ii) interacted each independent variable with industry dummies, and (iii) include 
state fixed effects, based on the location of an organization’s headquarters. Estimating the 
model on a yearly basis controls for the instability among coefficient estimates (i.e., the 
coefficient of cost of goods sold, selling, general and administrative expenses, sales, and size 
vary across time), which may arise due to changes in the environmental context. In addition, 
interacting the independent variables with industry dummies enable us to further capture 
unique aspects that characterize each industry. Finally, we included state fixed effects controls 
for time-invariant state heterogeneity. For instance, demand and supply of labor and the cost 
of living are expected to be more homogeneous among same state organizations. 
Using this approach, we estimated the regression model and evaluated the coefficient 
estimates using information for each firm to estimate a predicted employee compensation as a 
fraction of the number of employees. Generally, the model performed very well, the average 
coefficient estimates of the independent variables across all the years/industries were positive, 
as expected, and the average adjusted R2 was 0.78. Finally, we imputed missing employee’s 
pay with the predicted employee’s compensation as a fraction of the number of employees.  
Control Variables  
We control for various M&A pair characteristics: The similarity in political ideology of the 
TMTs at the acquiring and target firms, because TMT political ideology similarity is seen as 
an attribute that supports similar decision-making style (Swigart et al., 2020), which results in 
cohesiveness at the executive suite (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). However, this logic is 
conceptually different from our theory on organizational ideological similarity, which regards 
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political ideology as another level of culture that sits on top of organizational culture, and that 
ideological differences between merging organizations are persistent and hard to re-engineer, 
and thus would create P-O (mis)fit in the M&A. Therefore, to be theoretically consistent, and 
concentrate on P-O (mis)fit in M&As, we use TMT political ideology similarity as a control. 
We measured the similarity between the two TMTs’ political ideology as the absolute 
difference in TMT’s political ideology between the M&A acquirer and its target multiplied by 
-1 (s|TMT political ideology|). Other control variables  included the product similarity score 
(Hoberg & Phillips, 2010), the difference between acquirer and target size (Rhodes-Kropf & 
Robinson, 2008), the difference between acquirer and target profitability (Capron & Shen, 
2007), the difference between acquirer and target market-to-book ratio (Rhodes-Kropf & 
Robinson, 2008), the difference in distance between acquirer and target headquarters 
(Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011), and the difference between acquirer and target in the rights to 
work in a state (John, Knyazeva, & Knyazeva, 2015). 
Additionally, we controlled for the following firm-level variables (for both the acquirer 
and target): Firm size (Size), defined as the natural logarithm of total assets; Firm profitability 
(ROA), defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; Cash holdings 
(Cash), defined as the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets; Leverage 
(Leverage), defined as the ratio of long-term and current debt to total assets; Market-to-book 
ratio (Market-to-Book), defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of 
assets; Research and development (R&D Expenses), defined as the ratio of research and 
development expenses to sales; Advertising (Advertising Expenses), defined as the ratio of 
advertising expenses to sales. 
 Empirical analysis 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of the acquirer and target firms and the M&A pair 
characteristics for both the actual M&As and hypothetical M&As. Table 2 shows the 
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correlations of the M&A pair characteristics. Most of the variables exhibit the expected 
correlations. To test the impact of multicollinearity on the estimation process, we calculated 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs) values and the condition indices (Hair, 2009). None of 
these measures supported the existence of multicollinearity among the independent variables, 
including the interaction terms. Specifically, the highest VIF was 2.49, which is well below 10 
(Menard, 2008). The highest value of the condition index was 4.23, which is well below 30.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
M&A pairing likelihood  
Table 3 shows the results of the conditional logistic regression. Model 1 is a baseline model 
that includes all the control variables. As expected, similarity in TMTs’ political ideology is 
positive (0.43) and significant (p = 0.060). Moreover, consistent with prior literature, many 
other controls exhibit a significant effect on the likelihood of M&A pairing.  Hypothesis 1 
predicts that the probability of announcement of a merger increases when the merging firms 
have more similar organizational political ideologies. As shown in Model 2, the coefficient 
associated with the similarity of organizational political ideology is positive (0.26) and 
significant (p < 0.001). Thus, actual M&A pairs exhibit greater similarity of organizational 
political ideology than do hypothetical M&A pairs. To gain understanding of the economic 
importance of this result, we calculated the odds ratio for a one-unit increase in the similarity 
of organizational political ideology after setting all the control variables to zero i.e. setting them 
equal to their standardized mean. The results show that the odds of M&A pairing is 1.297, 
implying that a one unit increase in the similarity of organizational political ideology increases 
the probability of actual M&A pair by 29.7%. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported.   
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Model 3 includes an interaction term of similar organizational political ideology with 
the acquirer’s organizational political ideology homogeneity. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the 
positive relationship between the similarity of the organizational political ideology in the 
merging firms and the probability of a merger will be strengthened the more homogeneous the 
organizational political ideology of the acquirer. The results in Model 3 show that the 
interaction term is positively related to the probability of actual M&A pairs in relation to the 
hypothetical M&A pairs (0.26) and significant (p = 0.001). Figure 1 displays the change in the 
probability of an actual M&A pair at a certain time as a function of similar organizational 
political ideology at different levels of the acquirer’s organizational political ideology. When 
the acquirer’s organizational political ideology is homogeneous (one standard deviation above 
the mean), it intensifies the positive relationship between the similarity of the organizational 
political ideology and the actual M&A pairing. No such effect exists when the acquirer’s 
organizational political ideology is low (one standard deviation below the mean). Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
 Models 4 includes an interaction term of similar organizational political ideology with 
the human-capital intensity of the merging firms. As shown, the interaction term is positive 
(0.15) and statistically significant (p = 0.012). To further investigate this finding, in Figure 2, 
we plotted the change in the likelihood of an actual M&A pair as a function of similar 
organizational political ideology at high and low levels of human-capital intensity of the 
merging firms. At low levels of similarity of organizational political ideology of the merging 
firms, high human-capital intensive firms are less likely to merge compared to low human-
capital intensive firms. In addition, at high levels of similarity of organizational political 
ideology of the merging firms, the two lines converge, indicating that human capital intensity 
has no effect on the main relationship. These findings confirm hypothesis 3 which states that 
the main relationship will be strengthened the higher the human-capital intensity of the merging 
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firms. Nevertheless, findings show that the probability of announcement is bounded at high 
levels of similarity of organizational political ideology, probably because employees are more 
likely to stay post-merger when political ideology of the merging firms is similar, and therefore, 
the influence of human capital intensity is less noticeable. 
Finally, Model 5 presents the results of the full model. The results continue to support 
Hypotheses 1-3 and imply that organizational political ideology matters for merger 
announcements mostly when the acquirer’s organizational political ideology is homogeneous 
and in the presence of high human capital intensity of the merging firms.      
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3, Figures 1 and 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
ROBUSTNESS 
 Alternative matching  
Our results rely on the proper identification of hypothetical M&A pairs. Therefore, as a 
robustness check, we pair each acquiring firm with matched hypothetical target firms. 
Specifically, we used CEM algorithm to find hypothetical target firms that exhibit similar size 
and market-to-book ratio and geographic distance between headquarters relative to the actual 
M&A target firms. The advantage of this matching approach is that it enables us to control for 
acquirer fixed factors, which may affect target selection; an example of such a factor is the 
acquirer acquisition experience. The results shown in Panel A of Table 4 (in the spirit of Model 
2 of Table 2) are not sensitive to acquirer fixed factors.    
------------------------------ 





Scholars have argued that the social structure in which the organization is embedded plays an 
important role in M&A decisions (Cai & Sevilir, 2012). In addition, it is also possible that 
organizational political ideology is a product of the external social structure in which the 
organization is embedded. Therefore, our results could be an artifact of social structure and not 
organizational political ideology. One approach to deal with this issue, is to consider the 
information from organizational political ideology that is orthogonal (i.e., unique) to 
information from social structure; that is, to remove from the organizational political ideology 
the variation that is common with social structure. If the orthogonalized organizational political 
ideology still matters for the M&A likelihood, it will reinforce our conclusion that 
organizational political ideology contains unique information, unrelated to social structure, 
which is important in M&A likelihoods. To implement this idea, we estimated a linear 
regression model where the dependent variable is the similarity in organizational political 
ideology and the independent variables are factors that capture the social structure in which the 
firm is embedded. Assuming that social structure captures direct and indirect relationships 
within the firm’s environment (Gulati, 1995), we used factors such as interlocked directors 
(Gulati, 1995), political networks (Park & Rethemeyer, 2012), geographic distance between 
headquarters (Sorenson & Audia, 2000), state pair fixed effects and M&A deal fixed effects. 
We defined interlocked directors as directors that were serving in at least one of the boards of 
the merging firms during the M&A announcement year and had served before on the board of 
the other paired firm. These directors were identified using data provided by Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2014). We measured political networks using donations to the same candidates by (i) 
executives (TMT including CEO) and (ii) political action committees (PACs). Specifically, 
political executive networks are set to 1 when the TMTs, including the CEOs, of the M&A 
pairs made at least one donation to the same candidate during the five election cycles prior to 
the M&A announcement, and zero otherwise. Likewise, PACs networks are set to 1 when the 
24 
 
PACs of the M&A pairs made at least one donation to the same candidate during the five 
election cycles prior to the M&A announcement, and zero otherwise. To avoid counting 
coincidental donations to the same recipient we excluded donations made in presidential 
elections and donations made to PACs. 
The objective of this model was to decompose the variation of similarity in 
organizational political ideology into a predicted component, conditional on social structure, 
and an unexpected component (i.e., the residual of this regression) which is the variation in 
similarity in organizational political ideology that is orthogonal to the social structure (i.e., not 
explained by social structure). We then used the orthogonalized organizational political 
ideology and re-ran Models 2 and 5 of Table 2. As shown in Panel B of Table 4, the results 
remain qualitatively similar attesting that we capture a unique organizational political ideology 
effect on M&A likelihoods.  
In addition, we tested the robustness of our results using an alternative measure of 
organizational political ideology. Specifically, we used Bonica’s (2016) individual political 
ideology scores, which are based on their contributions over time, to re-calculate organizational 
political ideology. Finally, we examined whether the effect of similarity of organizational 
political ideology on M&A likelihood is a recent phenomenon, driven by the overwhelming 
coverage of press on issues related to political ideology and polarization in recent years, or if 
it has been as salient to employees in the earlier period of our sample. Untabulated results, 
which are available upon request, show a similar effect on M&A likelihood using the 
alternative measure of organizational political ideology. In addition, the organizational political 
ideology effect is not a recent phenomenon, but prevails throughout the sample period.    
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
Our basic theoretical premise is that managers choose targets with similar organizational 
political ideology in order to increase employee retention after the merger. We implicitly 
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investigate this premise by running a regression model on the sample of actual completed 
M&As. The dependent variable was the employee retention rate, defined as the number of 
employees at the merged firm three years after the merger minus the sum of the number of 
employees at the acquirer and target one year prior to the merger, scaled by the number of 
employees at the acquirer and target one year prior to the merger. The main independent 
variable is the similarity in organizational political ideology of the merging organizations. 
Control variables include M&A pair, acquirer and target characteristics.  
 It is possible that the characteristics of M&As with high vs low similarity in 
organizational political ideology may differ. If so, linear control variables may be inadequate, 
and any relationship between the similarity of organizational political ideology and employee 
retention may be due to biases arising from non-linear effects of control variables. We address 
this empirical challenge by employing an Entropy Balancing (EB) technique that re-weights 
control group observations such as mean, standard deviation and skewness of the covariates 
from the control group to become similar to those of the treatment group (Hainmueller, 2012).  
We defined as treatment group M&As with high similarity in organizational political ideology 
(i.e., above the mean values) and used an EB technique to identify continuous weights for the 
control group that balance the covariates efficiently. Then we performed a weighted OLS 
regression.  
The results are shown in Table 5. In Model 1, the coefficient estimate of the similarity 
of organizational political ideology is positive (0.12) and significant (p = 0.026). The economic 
impact of this is that, a one-unit increase in the similarity of organizational political ideology 
increases employee retention by 12.56%. Because the dependent variable, as constructed, does 
not consider fluctuations of the economy across time, we also used as a dependent variable an 
industry-adjusted retention rate. The results in Model 2 continue to support the view that the 
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similarity of organizational political ideology is an important factor that influences employee 
retention. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
This study seeks to answer the research question, ‘Does similarity of the political ideologies of 
the merging organizations affect merger likelihood?’. The findings provide support for a 
positive relationship between the similarity of organizational political ideologies and the 
likelihood of an actual M&A announcement relative to a hypothetical M&A announcement. In 
addition, we find that this relationship is strengthened (i) when the political ideology within 
the acquiring firm is more homogeneous, and (ii) when the merging organizations are more 
human-capital intensive. Moreover, additional analysis shows that similarity of organizational 
political ideology of the merging firms positively affects employee retention post-merger, 
which supports the logic that acquirers choose targets with similar organizational political 
ideology in order to reduce the risk of employee turnover after the merger.  
This study contributes to the emerging literature on organizational political ideology and 
the literature on organizational values in M&As. We integrate the literature on political 
ideology and P-O fit to enrich the literature on the influence of organizational values on M&As. 
Previous studies that have examined P-O fit in political ideology have focused on employee 
relationships within the organization (for a meta-analysis see Kristof-Brown et al. (2005)). 
Moreover, another stream of literature has scrutinized the impact of organizational political 
ideology on firm decisions concerning internal matters, such as corporate social responsibility 
initiatives (Chin et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2017). The idea of political ideology matching, in 
this study, extends the theoretical application of organizational political ideology to M&As, 
and also possibly to other inter-organizational partnerships where large numbers of employees 
move across organizational boundaries and integrate with employees from another 
organization, such as in joint ventures or in outsourcing arrangements. Likewise, in these types 
27 
 
of partnership employees may experience P-O political ideological misfit. Therefore, to the 
extent that these partnerships encompass senior management involvement in decision-making 
and are contractually committing (Mudambi & Venzin, 2010), managers may pro-actively act 
to protect against employee turnover.  
In addition, our theoretical approach offers a more nuanced perspective on M&A misfit 
since we recognize the numerous facets of values that characterize the organizational encounter 
between two firms participating in an M&A and how ideological matching affects acquisition 
bids (refer also to Teerikangas and Very (2006)). In asserting that political ideology is imported 
into the organization, and is a set of higher order social values that are deeply rooted in 
individuals’ belief systems, we assert that political ideology is a source for P-O identification 
in mergers. Hence, we contribute to studies which note that greater complexity than hitherto 
believed characterizes the organizational encounter between the two firms participating in an 
M&A (Teerikangas & Very, 2006). This theoretical approach extends the literature on the 
cultural perspective of M&As, which has tended to focus greatly on the influence of 
organizational culture at the post-merger stage (Stahl & Voigt, 2008).      
Moreover, research is silent on the way in which organizational values influence M&A 
announcements, because in the early stages of the merger process there is little information to 
allow for any accurate diagnosis of organizational values (Teerikangas & Very, 2006). 
Findings show that acquirers bid for targets with similar ideology, which may suggest that 
managers in the acquiring firm make an effort, before the merger, to find a partner who has a 
matching ideology. Therefore, by studying the relationship between ideological similarity and 
M&A announcements, our study contributes to the understanding of factors that influence the 
choice of target firms. The extant literature focuses mostly on the strategic synergies and 
financial implications apparent at this stage of the M&A process, but pays scant attention to 
organizational issues (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999).  
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Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on organizational identity (Anteby & Molnár, 
2012; Corley & Gioia, 2004; Storgaard, Tienari, Piekkari, & Michailova, 2020) by showing 
that maintenance of organizational identity is no accident, but rather, is preserved by actors, 
such as top managers, in their effort to realize their objectives (Storgaard et al., 2020). For 
example, Collet, Carnabuci, Ertug, and Zou (2020) show how ideological similarity with the 
majority enables actors to perpetuate their ideas. In this study we show that acquirers choose 
targets with similar political ideology in their effort to hold the M&A together.  
 Finally, our findings have implications for managers. The strong ideological orientations 
of some organizations, and the need for employees in these organizations to voice their social 
beliefs and pursue advocacy in accordance with these beliefs, despite the risk of alienating 
workers who do not subscribe to their ideology (Smith & Korschun, 2018), may indicate how 
significant it is to consider P-O ideology fit in M&As, which involve the creation of a new 
organization. This inference is supported by our findings, which show that mergers with more 
similar organizational political ideologies are associated with higher employee retention. 
Consequently, managers who are concerned about employee turnover after the merger may 
consider the similarity of the organizational political ideology of the target before bidding. 
 As with all empirical studies, ours has its limitations. Our study assumes a two-party 
system, and a clear matching of parties to ideologies, which may not be apparent in certain 
countries. As a result, the applicability of our empirical findings should be extended with 
caution beyond US firms since the operationalization of political ideology is based on 
employee contribution data which are available in the US. However, given that the ideological 
terms ‘left’ (corresponding to liberal) and ‘right’ (corresponding to conservative) have 
consistent meaning across space and time, and that this assumption is substantiated in a variety 
of national contexts (Di Tella & MacCulloch, 2005), our theoretical arguments can, to some 
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extent, be generalized. Nevertheless, more research is needed on M&As in different country 
contexts using different kinds of operationalizations of political ideology.  
 In addition, in this study, we have measured political ideology following the 
methodology of Gupta et al. (2017) and we have validated the results using Bonica’s (2016) 
CFscores. Both measures use employee donations to political parties. Although it is true that 
some political giving is motivated by a desire for influence, prior studies overall, conclude that 
donations from individuals are motivated by personal ideology (Bonica, 2014). Thus, we assert 
that the use of political donation data, especially when it is examined over an extended period, 
should yield a valid indicator of one’s political ideology. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that 
political ideology is a complex psychological construct (Chin et al., 2013), and therefore our 
gauge may be less than precise. More direct observations through surveys and experiments 
may unveil new information on the part played by organizational political ideology in 
managerial decisions. Such data should also help to explicate the mechanisms supporting the 
link between political ideological values and managerial perceptions. Future work might 
therefore also harness the use of additional data sources to supplement our measure of political 
ideology, such as by looking at speeches by, interviews with, or surveys and media reports of 
top management teams (Chin et al., 2013).  
Moreover, we recommend that future research examine additional contextual factors that 
determine when political ideology is more salient at the individual or organizational level, and 
therefore, when political ideology may be a bigger factor in target selection (Swigart et al., 
2020). In line with this, research may ascertain the circumstances under which misfits are better 
enabled to manage their dissimilarity within the newly formed organization, and therefore, 
reduce the risks of employee turnover post-merger (Edwards, Caplan, & Van Harrison, 1998). 
For example, studies suggest that misfits preserve a positive sense of self by choosing with 
which organizational values to identify (Besharov, 2014). Such research would also extend the 
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literature on political ideology post-merger, and enrich the literature on managing cultural 
differences (Stahl & Voigt, 2008). In addition, the concept of organizational ideological 
matching is relevant in many corporate contexts, since (mis-)matching of ideologies may 
influence employees’ perceptions of cultural fit when employees from different organizations 
come to work together (Van Knippenberg et al., 2002). Consequently, future studies may 
examine political ideology matching within the perspective of P-O fit to other areas of 
corporate partnership where employees move across organizational boundaries, such as with 
respect to joint ventures and outsourcing arrangements.  
An intriguing question raised by our findings is that, if managers are aware that differing 
ideologies of merging workforces will lead to turnover, why would they still persist in such 
M&As? Other than for strategic synergies and financial advantages, one other explanation may 
be that clustering of likeminded people may give rise to the expression of extreme ideologies, 
whereby some employees may express extreme views and alienate other employees. Indeed, 
ideologically motivated insults and attacks in the workplace are on the rise (Davydoff, 2018). 
Therefore, it could be that managers, through the means of M&A, are motivated to “rid their 
house” of extreme elements. We encourage other researchers to conduct more research to 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 




Mean SD Median Mean SD Median 
Acquirer characteristics        
Organizational political ideology 0.479 0.109 0.500 0.478 0.128 0.500 0.128 
Organizational political ideology 
homogeneity 
-0.929 0.593 -0.902 -1.001 0.642 -0.938 2.427 
Human capital intensity 67.134 34.110 62.582 70.301 41.051 62.735 -1.825 
TMT political ideology 0.350 0.255 0.369 0.350 0.268 0.386 -0.026 
Size 8.925 1.523 8.940 8.838 1.453 8.940 1.157 
ROA 0.137 0.075 0.134 0.118 0.077 0.114 5.178 
Cash 0.117 0.152 0.055 0.124 0.151 0.061 -0.928 
Leverage 0.239 0.158 0.224 0.240 0.173 0.226 -0.196 
Market-to-Book  2.146 1.502 1.686 1.879 1.392 1.427 3.637 
R&D Expenses 0.039 0.068 0.000 0.040 0.075 0.000 -0.061 
Advertising Expenses  0.009 0.019 0.000 0.008 0.018 0.000 0.662 
        
Target characteristics        
Organizational political ideology 0.486 0.093 0.500 0.484 0.099 0.500 0.431 
Human capital intensity 67.159 35.470 60.897 69.171 38.506 62.062 -1.136 
TMT political ideology 0.356 0.250 0.500 0.384 0.275 0.500 -2.214 
Size 7.332 1.568 7.197 7.460 1.628 7.481 -1.648 
ROA 0.122 0.092 0.122 0.106 0.095 0.106 3.557 
Cash 0.158 0.187 0.070 0.147 0.181 0.066 1.258 
Leverage 0.232 0.186 0.222 0.218 0.181 0.196 1.580 
Market-to-Book 1.955 1.318 1.495 1.774 1.191 1.350 2.825 
R&D Expenses 0.051 0.095 0.000 0.046 0.098 0.000 1.018 
Advertising Expenses 0.009 0.020 0.000 0.007 0.018 0.000 1.326 
        
M&A characteristics        
s|Organizational political 
ideology| 
-0.074 0.104 -0.027 -0.094 0.123 -0.023 2.987 
Human capital intensity  67.007 30.936 61.313 69.759 34.228 63.616 -1.776 
s|TMT political ideology| -0.256 0.227 -0.211 -0.269 0.237 -0.250 1.152 
Product similarity 0.137 0.070 0.134 0.133 0.065 0.132 1.771 
s|Size| -1.718 1.357 -1.422 -1.633 1.256 -1.271 -1.282 
s|ROA| -0.063 0.094 -0.033 -0.069 0.116 -0.035 1.248 
s|Market-to-Book| -0.822 1.294 -0.348 -0.727 1.194 -0.327 -1.504 
s|Geographic| -0.183 0.201 -0.105 -0.176 0.190 -0.105 -0.632 
s|Right to work| 0.271 0.445 0.000 0.281 0.450 0.000 -0.458 
Note: The sample of actual M&A announcements consists of 479 observations. The sample of Hypothetical 
M&As consists of 2,899 observations. 
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Table 2. Pearson Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
M&A characteristics                   
1. Actual M&A Dummy 1                  
2. s|Organizational political ideology| 0.045
** 1                 
3. Acquirer’s organizational political 
ideology homogeneity 
0.035* 0.160*** 1                
4. Human capital intensity -0.044
* -0.074*** 0.099*** 1               
5. s|TMT political ideology| 0.034
* 0.035* 0.045** -0.002 1              
Acquirer characteristics                   
6. Size 0.016 -0.296
*** -0.185*** 0.282*** -0.019 1             
7. ROA 0.091
*** -0.024 -0.072*** -0.297*** -0.040* -0.189*** 1            
8. Cash -0.024 0.025 0.220
*** 0.188*** 0.001 -0.261*** 0.034* 1           
9. Leverage -0.002 0.020 -0.094
*** -0.108*** 0.008 0.097*** -0.041* -0.432*** 1          
10. Market-to-Book 0.097
*** 0.011 0.094*** -0.149*** 0.006 -0.305*** 0.527*** 0.455*** -0.301*** 1         
11. R&D Expenses 0.013 0.040
* 0.170*** 0.155*** -0.003 -0.240*** 0.071*** 0.661*** -0.312*** 0.506*** 1        
12. Advertising Expenses 0.001 -0.080
*** 0.054** -0.081*** -0.012 0.043* 0.104*** 0.144*** -0.130*** 0.175*** 0.076*** 1       
Target characteristics                   
13. Size -0.027 -0.185
*** -0.134*** 0.209*** -0.006 0.561*** -0.255*** -0.335*** 0.178*** -0.397*** -0.384*** -0.040* 1      
14. ROA 0.062
*** -0.069*** -0.064*** -0.256*** -0.023 -0.064*** 0.327*** -0.067*** 0.072*** 0.146*** -0.033† 0.022 0.010 1     
15. Cash 0.026 0.067
*** 0.178*** 0.144*** -0.024 -0.258*** 0.103*** 0.514*** -0.281*** 0.408*** 0.546*** 0.071*** -0.495*** -0.107*** 1    
16. Leverage 0.026 -0.036
* -0.118*** -0.078*** 0.002 0.135*** -0.010 -0.302*** 0.328*** -0.221*** -0.270*** -0.070*** 0.341*** 0.025 -0.486*** 1   
17. Market-to-Book 0.061
*** -0.004 0.085*** -0.108*** 0.002 -0.230*** 0.292*** 0.318*** -0.152*** 0.552*** 0.397*** 0.097*** -0.389*** 0.327*** 0.461*** -0.272*** 1  
18. R&D Expenses 0.033
† 0.085*** 0.167*** 0.142*** -0.003 -0.269*** 0.100*** 0.523*** -0.238*** 0.432*** 0.687*** 0.027 -0.469*** -0.191*** 0.700*** -0.346*** 0.424*** 1 
19. Advertising Expenses 0.027 -0.038
* 0.045** -0.078*** -0.028 0.009 0.020 0.070*** -0.114*** 0.104*** -0.009 0.286*** -0.010 0.002 0.074*** -0.107*** 0.092*** -0.011 
Note: N = 3,378  
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 3. Conditional logistic regression of the probability of being an actual merger 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
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s|Organizational political ideology| 
x Acquirer’s organizational 











s|Organizational political ideology| 











Max-rescaled R2 0.045 0.056 0.059 0.059 0.061 
Walt X2 73*** 98*** 107*** 107*** 113*** 
Note: N = 3,378. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   




Table 4. Robustness Checks  
Panel A. Alternative matching  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 




































M&A characteristics   















s|Organizational political ideology| x 












Max-rescaled R2 0.064 0.073 
Walt X2 56*** 59*** 
   
Panel B. Alternative Explanation 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 

















Residual of s|Organizational political 
ideology| x Acquirer’s organizational 
political ideology homogeneity 
 0.275*** 
(0.053) 
Residual of s|Organizational political 
ideology| x Human capital intensity 
 0.139* 
(0.057) 
Acquirer characteristics’ controls Yes Yes 
Target characteristics’ controls Yes Yes 
Max-rescaled R2 0.058 0.066 
Walt X2 98*** 132*** 
Note: For Panel A, N = 3, 003; For Panel B, N = 3,378. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   



























































































M&A characteristics   





















R2 0.173 0.118 
F-test  6.38*** 5.04** 
Note: N = 436. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   




Figure 1 – Plot of the interaction effect of similarity in organizational political ideology and 






Figure 2 – Plot of the interaction effect of similarity in organizational political ideology and 
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